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Abstract 
This thesis is about health, change and user charges. In 1991 New 
Zealand embarked in a new direction for the funding of health services, 
including extensive use of a targeting regime in which 'those that can afford' 
social services were paying more so that those who could not were paying 
less. For the 'high-income' families classified as Group 3, th is meant that 
part charges at point of service were increased at all levels of health 
services. Concerns immediately arose that the income levels had been set 
too low and would create financial barriers for some 'high-income' families, 
particularly those on the margin. 
This thesis explores the demand response of 129 families in Group 3 to the 
new charges imposed by the Interim Targeting Regime. The survey 
population is characterised by high incomes and insurance coverage 
across income levels. Through a nonrandom survey methodology based 
on the opinions and perceptions of the user community (Group 3 workers 
and their families), over one-quarter of the survey families reported health 
services demand being diverted from allopathic medical services. 
However, even though 25% reported demand diversion, only 11 % of 
families reporting lowered health status. 
The study also looked at diversion from conventional medicine to 
alternatives including self-treatment, seeking advice from a chemist, 
complementary therapies or changing lifestyle habits. The data did not 
suggest diversion to alternatives equal to the reduction of conventional 
medical services. 
Through the use of nonparametric statistical techniques, characteristics of 
the survey population were analysed in an attempt to begin untangling a 
complex web of factors affecting the survey population's health services 
demand when faced with increases in price. Factors included in this study 
were income level, insurance coverage, health status, gender, family size 
and composition . 
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Various subsamples of the survey population reported different effects and 
different magnitudes of demand diversion. The differences between 
insured and uninsured families were particularly marked. Evidence 
provided by the user community implicates a high degree of moral hazard 
within the insured subsample. The study suggests further research on the 
influence on moral hazard in meeting the stated goals of the reforms. 
Because the study is nonrandom and exploratory, any claim of 
representativeness would be unwarranted. However, the study suggests 
that the attributes of high incomes and insurance coverage may be inherent 
to Group 3. To more accurately assess the representativeness of any 
research on the effects of the increase in part charges on Group 3, the study 
proposes a further clarification of the specific attributes of the families 
belonging in the Group 3 category is necessary. 
Finally, the study questions the adequacy of the targeting regime and the 
increase in part charges for meeting the objectives set out by the health 
reformers, particularly in respect to the objectives of cost containment and 
individuals becoming more responsible for their own health. 
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Health and health policy in New Zealand 
Health is a precious condition of our lives. We need good health to work, to 
raise our children, to live productive and enriching lives. Good health is so 
important that even in good health we act preventively to maintain health. 
We seek diagnostic procedures which might give us an early indication of 
illness. We may watch our diet, exercise and generally live our lives in 
ways to promote good health. 
On the other hand, ill health disrupts the routine of our lives. It can 
incapacitate us physically and mentally. Serious ill health can lead to long-
term disability or unemployment. It is no wonder when we are ill we often 
take immediate steps to regain our good health. These actions may include 
accessing conventional medical services which carry costs some of us 
cannot afford. 
This thesis is about health, health-seeking behaviours and public policy. In 
February 1992 New Zealand embarked in a new direction for health 
services moving to a 'more market' philosophy which included a greater 
reliance on user pays as part of its cost-containment strategy. Part-charges 
were increased with the idea that people would think more carefully about 
accessing health services resulting in an overall reduction in utilisation of 
health services and the state's financial commitment. 
The National Government divided the population of New Zealand into three 
groups Rather than 'need' being classified by those often requiring a higher 
than average number of services, entitlement to subsidies became defined 
by the total household income of the 'family unit'. Group 1 was defined as 
beneficiaries and their families, pensioners with little other income, families 
entitled to full Family Support and other low income individuals. Group 2 
was a very small group made up of families entitled to partially abated 
Family Support. Group 3 was the 'all other' category - if a family was 
excluded from Group 1 or Group 2 entitlement, that family belonged to 
Group 3. Group 3, the high-income families, were to pay more for their 
2 
health care while generous subsidies would be granted to the low-income 
and middle-income families. 
By moving away from more universally applied health services and 
subsidies to a targeting regime, concerns arose over the question of 
thresholds. How high do incomes need to be in order for families to be able 
to 'afford' health care? Eligibility for Group 3 status did not automatically 
mean families who were not entitled to more generous substitutes could 
'afford' the new pricing schemes. How would Group 3 families react if they 
found their access to health services compromised by the increases in part-
charges? Would they forego or delay treatment, even if it meant prolonged 
or greater ill health? Would the demand for health services be diverted to 
other forms of care? 
As an American with first-hand experience in one of the most market-
oriented health delivery systems in the world, I found not only the history of 
New Zealand's health services but also its struggle to push delivery in 'more 
market' directions to be quite absorbing. My experiences purchasing health 
services through the market led me to question not only the efficacy but the 
ideological foundations of National's strategies. Particularly, I wondered if 
targeted cost sharing offered the benefits National believed it had. Personal 
experience with many years of cost sharing led me to be very cautious in 
embracing cost sharing (or 'user pays' as it is called in New Zealand) as an 
effective tool for ensuring a healthier New Zealand. 
I became further interested in the differences between market-oriented 
private and public health service delivery systems. I came to understand 
that cost sharing, a strategy used in many welfare states to ration its health 
resources, has definite implications for not only clinical medicine and health 
economics but political science, social policy, ethics and philosophy as well. 
Questions regarding Group 3's reactions to increased part-charges could 
only be answered through studying possible changes in the health-seeking 
behaviours of Group 3 workers and their families. Understanding how and 
why people make their health-seeking and care-seeking choices when 
faced with considerations of affordability became the underlying motivation 
for this thesis. New Zealand's reforms to its medical services subsidies 
provided a 'natural experiment' to study the effects of changes in price 
relative to demand for services. 
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Regardless of the shift from universal to targeted health services, the 
policies established by the National Government did not entirely abdicate 
the welfare state's responsibility for the health of its citizens. In this 
introductory chapter, the welfare state's commitment to health care provision 
in general is discussed. Then National's health reforms are briefly 
summarised before turning to look more specifically at its strategies of 
targeting and user pays1• User pays as a strategy of health care reform is 
reviewed, specifically at the level of primary care. The aims of this study 
and outline of the thesis will conclude this chapter. 
Health policy and the Welfare State 
Because we not only value our own health but the health of others, the 
welfare state has assumed in varying degrees some responsibility for the 
health of its constituents. Unfortunately, unlike other social services 
provided in various forms, 'health' is not a commodity that can be traded like 
housing or food. It cannot be measured in units or kilograms. One difficulty 
faced by the welfare state is the definition of 'good health' which Blank 
(1993:4) maintains is varied by and intrinsically bound to racial, ethnic and 
cultural factors. Although the meaning of 'health' remains elusive, 'health 
services' can be defined and measured. To say that health has become a 
responsibility of the welfare state is somewhat inaccurate. What the welfare 
state can and does provide is access to health services. 
Whether those health services are meeting the needs of the welfare state's 
constituents are often determined by measures of health status. Since it is 
extremely difficult to define what 'health' is, in order to provide services; the 
welfare state has come to define health by what it is not. Indicators of health 
status have focused on the 'absence of disease' instead of the prevalence 
The terms cost sharing, co-payment, user pays and part-charges for the purpose 
of this thesis are similar but not interchangeable. 'Cost sharing' will be used to 
broadly describe any strategy, public or private, to charge the user a fee at the 
point of service and encompasses 'co-payments', 'deductibles' and 'user pays'. 'Co-
payment' refers specifically to the charge required by insurance companies which is 
paid by users of health services at point of service. 'Deductible' refers to the 
amount paid by the consumer at point of service not reimbursed by private 
insurance. 'User pays' generally refers to a strategy of charging all or part of the 
costs of providing a publicly-funded service to the users rather than paying all 
costs through taxes or general revenue . The term 'part-charges' is more specific 
referring to the actual amount patients might expect to pay at point of service. 
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of health. Mortality and morbidity statistics have become the accepted 
substitute for measures of health status and have often driven health policy. 
Because the complexity, capriciousness and undifferentiated nature of 
illness and disease precludes the welfare state from guaranteeing good 
health, the welfare state has focused on guaranteeing access to health 
services as a substitute. Some welfare states have elevated access to 
health services to the status of a public good, leading to universal schemes. 
Even the most reluctant welfare states have declared health to be a key 
ingredient for productivity and integral to the ability and right to fully 
participate in society. 
While there is no controversy that health policy is a high priority for welfare 
states, there is ample divergence of opinion on how an individual state's 
health policy can best achieve a healthy society. The continuum for the 
Western world runs from fully integrated public health systems paid for by 
general taxes as in the Netherlands to a subsidised but predominantly 
market-oriented health care system in the United States (see Blank 1994:57 
for a convenient typology). 
New Zealand's health system 
Hewitt ( 1992) argues ideology has played a formal role in the development 
and conception of welfare states and their strategies and institutions. Since 
its Social Security Act of 1938, New Zealand's health policies could be said 
to reflect an ideology in which access to health services is viewed as a 
positive right of citizenship. For New Zealand, this has meant not only 
economic but geographic access to health cares services for all New 
Zealanders. After expanding the 1938 provisions of the Social Security Act 
to general practice in 1941, New Zealand incrementally began to provide 
universal access to many health services and heavily subsidised those that 
were not universally provided such as primary care. 
At the time of my arrival from the United States to New Zealand in 1991, 
New Zealanders still benefited from a health delivery system with a strong 
universal flavour. Public hospital care and most laboratory work were 
substantially free, pharmaceuticals were heavily subsidised and the 
General Medical Services (GMS) benefit paid a portion (but increasingly 
smaller portion) of the charge for visits to general practitioners. Although a 
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private health system was increasingly available and insurance was a 
growth industry, for most New Zealanders I met, the delivery system either 
owned, administered or subsidised by the government continued to be their 
first choice for medical services. 
However, this was changing. Although the budget for health services 
increased substantially throughout the 70s and 80s, demand in the public 
sector was not met with an adequate supply. This resulted in long queues 
for everything from operations to specialist services. As a response, more 
and more New Zealanders were beginning to look to the private delivery 
system for care. Increasingly, New Zealanders began to purchase health 
insurance to insure a choice between long queues in the public sector and 
the unsubsidised significantly higher costs of the private sector. By 1992, 
forty-five percent of the population had private health insurance, making up 
3.5% of the total expenditures on health (New Zealand 1992 Yearbook, 
124). 
Recognising the need for reform and wishing to abate its accelerating 
financial commitment to health services, New Zealand governments began 
designing ways to decrease dependence on its public delivery system and 
reduce total costs. Although reform had begun by earlier regimes, the 
ideology reflected by the reforms of the National government elected in 
1990 were decidedly 'more market' than any previous. National 
Government's initiatives have included major cuts in social assistance, 
changes in targeting methods and a redesign of the manner in which the 
State provides its services (Boston 1992a:1 ). 
National's reforms for the health sector included both supply-side and 
demand-side changes. On the supply side, the National Government 
proposed an 'internal market' model, severing the purchasing and providing 
roles of public health services with the goal of increasing competition and 
accountability while decreasing the difficulty in determining actual costs of 
delivery. On the demand side, a scheme of targeted user pays by income 
grouping was introduced in order to reduce the government's total dollars 
spent on health care and to reduce demand for 'unnecessary' services. 
As established in the Minister of Health's (1991 a) Your Health and the 
Public Health, the official policy goals were couched in such consumerist 
6 
terms as improving access, reducing waiting times and widening choice. 
These official policy goals did not specifically identify the need to reduce 
government spending on health, but the message contained in the 1991 
Budget was clear. National sought to slow the steady increase of health 
spending as part of New Zealand's national budget. 
The role of targeted user pays in the reforms 
The move to a targeted system which included significantly increasing the 
part-charges for 'high-income' families was a significant change from the 
previous system in which family practice subsidies were awarded because 
of an individual's affiliation with a group defined by their general health 
status as needing extra help in accessing health services (e.g. children and 
the elderly). Under the new regime, only the chronically ill were given 
special status, a status that had to be 'proved' for entitlement by utilising 
services until a certain number of services and pharmaceuticals had been 
reached. 
Reforms to cost sharing were across the board and included hospital stays, 
outpatient services, primary health care and pharmaceuticals. Initially, 
laboratory services were intended to be included but were never fully 
integrated into the cost-sharing arrangements. 
From 1941 through 1972 the subsidy level of the GMS saw very little 
amendment From 1972 to the present, subsidy levels have been the target 
of a great deal of revision . One might validly ask why there has been such a 
long period of quiescence over the issue of subsidy levels. Fougere 
(quoted in Hay, 1989:162) believes that many of those same people who 
might have the "time, money and political influence" effectively to pressure 
for greater subsidy have been absorbed into third-party payment systems, 
primarily private medical insurance. 
The preponderance of private medical insurance may not only be a factor in 
how people have responded politically to GMS levels, but also to how they 
might react to National's reforms. With nearly one half of all New 
Zealanders benefiting from insurance coverage at the time of the changes 
to cost sharing (Southern Cross Health Care Group, 1990), reimbursals 
from insurance claims could cushion the effect of increased user pays 
producing decreases in utilisation that might be lower than desirable to 
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meet policy goals. On the other hand, as government subsidies decrease, 
insurance companies experienced an increase in costs, resulting in 
increased premiums. Indeed, one of the findings of this study was that 
certain individuals chose to discontinue coverage due to increase 
premiums (see Chapter 6, "Changes in Insurance"). 
Table 1.1 presents the value of primary care and pharmaceutical subsidies 
for Group 3, before and after the initial round of reforms to user pays as well 
as the average patient charge from 1 February 1992. Keeping in mind 
many Group 3 members would have insurance cover, even though adults of 
this group received no subsidy from the government, insurance reimbursals 
would have returned as much as 90% of the part-charges for primary care 
services to those with coverage. Certainly, with the moral hazards of 
insurance coverage factored in, as will be discussed in Chapter 3, no clear 
cut price/demand relationship could be expected. 
It was perhaps inevitable with the fundamental shift from health-related 
need to income-related need that persons utilising health services came to 
be described as 'winners' or 'losers' (see O'Dea, et al. 1993; Davis, et al. 
1994, 117). Generally, 'winners' were declared to be Group 1 and 2 adults 
and Group 1 pensioners whose subsidy under the new regime increased. 
Children of Group 3 families were declared 'losers' as were Group 3 adults 
and pensioners. Without the less than obvious effects of insurance as a 
factor, such distinctions could be clearly drawn. 
Olliver (1988:3) reasons "because there need to be losers if there are to be 
winners, some attention is paid to those at whose cost social policy goals 
were achieved." In the case of National's reforms, Group 3 seemed at first 
glance to be clearly the losers. But with a large number of Group 3 
members having insurance compounding the effects of racial, ethnic and 
cultural factors on utilisation, could such a distinction be made with 
certainty? Or, as insurance premiums increased, would more Group 3 
families drop their insurance coverage? This study concentrates on those 
at whose cost the social policy goals of National's health reforms seemed to 
be achieved. 
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Table 1.1 
Prima Care Subsidies to 1 Februa 1992 
1 /2/92 
General Medical Services benefit Before 1/9/90- 1 /2/91 - After Patient 
1/9/90 1/2/91 1 /2/92 1 /2/92 Charge 
Children 0-4 $16 $29 $25 $15 $16 
Children 5+ $16 $24 $20 $15 $16 
Adults $4 $4 0 0 $31 
Beneficiaries $12 $12 $12 0 $31 
Elderly $12 $17 $12 0 $31 
Chronically ill (child 0-4) $16 $29 $25 $25 $6 
Chronically ill (Child 5+) $16 $24 $20 $20 $11 
Chronically ill (Adult) $12 $17 $17 $17 $14 
Prescription charges 
Children 0-4 $2 $5 $20 
Children 5+ $2 $5 $20 
Adults $5 $15 $20 
Beneficiaries $2 $5 $20 
Elderly $2 $5 $20 
Chronicall~ ill $2 $5 $5 
Table adapted from Ashton 1992b, 151and159 
Primary care and user pays 
Utilisation studies investigating the effect of cost sharing on various levels of 
health services have repeatedly indicated that the inverse relationship 
between price and health care services utilisation may be the strongest at a 
primary care level (Lohr, et al. 1986; Manning, et al. 1987; Keeler and Rolph 
1988). In other words, increasing cost sharing for primary care consultation 
resulted in greater percentages of reduced utilisation than for other 
ambulatory services and secondary care. 
The strength of this apparent price/demand relationship is considered 
particularly important because (1) primary care physicians are often 
considered the 'gatekeepers' of other forms of both ambulatory and 
secondary care (Keeler and Rolph 1988), and (2) lack of access to primary 
and preventative care at an early stage is attributed to higher numbers of 
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'sicker' people being treated at later stages in illness or disease (Manning, 
et al. 1987). 
In thinking about these two concerns in relation to reducing overall costs of 
care, it appears that they may be conflicting effects. Certainly, they may act 
as counterbalances in a study of primary care utilisation. Grants to all 
regional health authorities consumed the highest percentage of Vote: 
Health at 70% (Department of Statistics 1992). If reducing primary care has 
the potential to reduce the demand for these services, logically a reduction 
in expenditure for these services would ensue. However, if keeping people 
away from general practitioners results in people being admitted to the 
hospital when they could have been treated much more cheaply by services 
and treatments available through their general practitioner, expenditures 
could increase. If moral hazard is present in the population, increasing the 
likelihood of ineffective or unnecessary care, it is equally possible that 
demand for primary care could be reduced without an erosion of health 
status. 
So in addition to the pure price/demand considerations of reducing primary 
care, less transparent, more long-term effects on secondary care should be 
explored. If all reduction in demand is the result of 'unnecessary' or 
'inappropriate' care we can reach our policy goals of cost-containment. If, 
however, as the RAND study suggests (Lohr, et al. 1986) increasing cost 
sharing indiscriminately results in a reduction in the episodes of care, 
'sicker' people may be showing up at their general practitioners or at the 
hospital, as many physicians and community service workers feared (Scott 
1992; Delahunty and McCabe 1993:8). In the long run, increasing part-
charges at a primary care level might place us further away from our policy 
goals of cost containment. 
The aim of this study 
A review of the pertinent studies, provided in Chapter 3, clearly indicates an 
inverse relationship between price (at time of service) and demand for 
primary care services. This policy study will focus not only on the fact or 
extent of this relationship but also on the responses to and results of 
decreased in utilisation. 
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This thesis specifically looks at the effect of increased part-charges on 
Group 3, particularly in the areas of general practice visits and the related 
downstream cost of pharmaceuticals. The empirical evidence from 
overseas suggests a decrease in utilisation but has that been the pattern for 
New Zealand's workers and their families? If families in Group 3 have 
reduced the number of general practice visits, has less medical care 
equated to lowered health status? If so, has there been any effect on wage-
earners' health and, therefore, their ability to earn? Have these families 
made any other changes in their health-seeking behaviours? Have the 
effects of increased part-charges been uniform across income levels? Is 
there a difference in the way insured and uninsured families in Group 3 
experienced the increases? From a policy perspective, are part-charges an 
effective tool for reducing utilisation of primary care services, thus useful for 
cost containment? Or, returning to the question of ideology, does this 
system of rationing reduce health status and increase inequity in New 
Zealand's health care system? 
In order to explore the effects of increased part-charges on workers and 
their families, this study employs a survey design through which 129 
families reported their experiences with the new cost-sharing arrangements 
in the first year of the changes. The results of their experiences form the 
basis of this thesis. 
Outline of thesis 
This chapter has introduced user pays as a tool for the 'more market' 
policies of the health reforms. User pays as a strategy for reform indicates 
an axiomatic belief in the price/demand relationship of neo-classical 
economics. This belief, and others prevalent in the neo-classical 
economics viewpoint, are inseparable from the political ideology of the 
framers of New Zealand's health reforms. Chapter 2 examines the 
interconnectedness of ideology, need and strategies for need fulfilment, 
reviewing the implications of ideology on policy design and specifically 
discussing the ideological bias of National's health reforms. Chapter 2 also 
summarises the economics of health, looking at health services as a 
'commodity' and examining commonly cited failures of the market for health 
care services. Cost sharing as an economic instrument of policy is more 
thoroughly explored in the third chapter. Key results of studies pertinent to 
the issue of cost sharing at a primary care level are provided and discussed. 
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The ideological perspective influencing the structure of this study as well as 
the study's research question and design are reported in chapter 4. 
Chapter 5 includes an overview of the survey results, supplying the 'general 
statistical' information provided by the respondents to the survey. Armed 
with the general overview provided in chapter 5, chapter 6 looks at how 
different subgroups within the survey population, delimited by income, 
insurance coverage, health status, gender, family size and composition 
have reacted to the changes in part-charge arrangements. My conclusions 
and the implications of this research for future health policy research and 
reforms are provided in chapter 7. 
Although cost sharing may encourage less dependence on others and 
more dependence on ourselves for our own health, there are also definite 
and unavoidable risks to this policy strategy. This thesis explores both the 
advantages and the disadvantages of user pays in the New Zealand context 
and reports the findings of 129 Group 3 working families as they 
experienced their first year under the reforms. 
